Upcoming Advisory — sec-zd-286

Apache Camel: Permissive default ObjectInputFilter pattern admits java.net.** and enables DNS-based information disclosure

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering ('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*', or the no-'javax.**' variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive 'java.**' glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object's class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis 'deserializationAllowList' / 'deserializationDenyList', Apache ActiveMQ Classic 'org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES') as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level 'deserializationFilter' option or the JVM-wide '-Djdk.serialFilter' system property with an explicit deny: '!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' (or '!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).

CVE IDCVE-2026-42527

CVSS v3.18.1 High

VendorApache

CWECWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

DisclosedJul 6, 2026

StatusPublished

01/Description

What this actually is.

Technical background, root cause, and affected surface.

The default ObjectInputFilter pattern ('java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*') used by several Camel components admits java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress through the recursive java.** glob. Deserializing a HashMap containing java.net.URL keys causes DNS queries to an attacker-supplied host as a side effect, while the class-level filter passes because HashMap is allow-listed. Exposure is highest in camel-jms, where JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms calls ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default).

Product: Apache Camel
Vendor: Apache
Severity: High
CVSS Score: 8.1
Status: Published
Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE: CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

02/Proof of Concept

From one request
to root shell.

Reproduced in a sandboxed environment. Requires only LAN or WiFi adjacency.

VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

ScopeUnchanged

ImpactC:H / I:H / A:H

SeverityHigh

PoC · Exploitation Steps▲ trigger

01No public PoC available

03/Vulnerable Code

The bug, and the fix.

Default ObjectInputFilter pattern 'java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*' in camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql; JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() -> ObjectMessage.getObject()

04/Impact

What an attacker does to you.

Post-exploitation outcomes mapped to CVSS impact metrics.

High

Out-of-band DNS-based information disclosure from the Camel host

CIA Impact

C:H · I:H · A:H

CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

05/Remediation

Fix it. In this order.

A runbook, not a checklist. Sequence matters — assume compromise before you act.

Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.21.0, 4.18.3 or 4.14.8 (CAMEL-23372). Until upgraded, configure JMS-provider allow-lists and a stricter deserializationFilter / -Djdk.serialFilter that excludes java.net.**.

N/A

Securin advisory — For coordinated remediation support or threat-actor briefings related to CVE-2026-42527, contact disclose@securin.io

06/Disclosure Timeline

Vendors moved in days.
Attackers in hours.

Reconstructed from vendor advisories, CISA bulletins, and Securin research records.

2026-04-28

Reported to vendor

2026-06-27

Fixed release published (4.21.0 (4.14.8 for 4.14.x, 4.18.3 for 4.18.x))

2026-07-06

CVE published to MITRE

Disclosed 60 days after discovery

07/References

Cite, verify, go deeper.

Primary sources — NVD, CISA KEV, and machine-readable IoC feed.

NVD

NVD — CVE-2026-42527

nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42527 →

SEC

Securin VI — Full Technical Analysis

vi.securin.io →

APACHE

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-42527.html

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-42527.html →

CVE

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42527

https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42527 →

NIST

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42527

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42527 →